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Abstract—This paper develops a theoretical model of location choice
under imperfect competition to formalize the notion that firms prefer to
locate “where the markets are.” The profitability of a location depends on
a term that weights demand in all locations by accessibility. Using a
sample of Japanese firms’ choices of regions within European countries,
we compare the theoretically derived measure of market potential with the
standard form used by geographers. Our results show that market potential
matters for location choice but cannot account entirely for the tendency of
firms in the same industry to agglomerate.
I. Introduction
We want to build our plants where the markets are.
IN December 1997, Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of Toyota,used the statement above to justify Toyota’s decision to
build a factory in northern France. At that time, analysts in
the press largely attributed that decision to the low market
share of the Japanese car manufacturer in France (1%) and
in Europe in general (3%).1 The Toyota example suggests
that even in the zero-tariff internal market of Europe, firms
still seek locations with superior market access. The man-
agers of Toyota apparently thought that their existing pro-
duction sites in Great Britain were not close enough to the
French market. The Wall Street Journal reported that
“Toyota . . . hopes to capture 3% [of the French market]
after opening its factory here in 2001.”
This paper connects two previously disparate strands of
the economic geography literature. The first strand demon-
strates a statistical tendency of firms to make the same
location decision as previous firms with similar attributes
(such as industry and national origin).2 Though such ag-
glomeration effects appear regularly in empirical work, they
are consistent with a variety of explanations. The second
strand comprises a large number of theoretical papers that
focus on a particular mechanism of agglomeration: namely,
that producers concentrate where demand is highest and
serve smaller markets via exporting.3
We link the two strands by showing how to derive the
firm’s location choice probabilities as a function of produc-
tion costs and a demand variable closely linked to the
measure of “market potential” introduced by Harris (1954).
We then take the model to the data, investigating whether
location choices of Japanese affiliates in Europe are driven
by market-access motivations a` la Krugman or some other
form of agglomeration effect. We find that the demand-pull
mechanism has some explanatory power, but it does not
appear to explain away the entire empirical agglomeration
effect.
The influence of market potential on the location of
producers and the wages they pay has been the subject of
several recent papers. Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003)
find that production increases on a more than one-for-one
basis with demand (the “home market effect”) in many
industries. As in their 1999 paper, we focus on how demand
affects the intranational location of production. As in their
2003 paper, we construct a market potential measure that
aggregates demand from multiple locations while discount-
ing for distance using a parameter obtained from a first-step
estimation using bilateral trade flows. In addition to distance
effects, our measure incorporates the effect of borders on
trade as well as a theoretically derived adjustment for
competition.
Hanson (2001) estimates the relationship between county-
level wages in the United States and market potential.
Structural estimation of this equation reveals that wages in
a county are increasing in demand emanating from all
American counties with weights declining exponentially in
bilateral distance. Redding and Venables (2004) follow a
similar line of reasoning for international data, using a
bilateral trade equation of a theoretical model to obtain
estimates of bilateral trade costs and of each country’s
market and supply accessibility. They find that international
inequality is closely linked to differences in market access.
Crozet (2004) uses the same theoretical framework and
shows that migration flows also respond to market potential.
The literature on firm location choice has not previously
estimated models directly derived from the Krugman
model. Prior work has, of course, considered demand, but
typically only local demand.4 Knowing the size of demand
in each of the districts a firm might choose is not sufficient,
for firms can export to nearby locations. Some studies, such
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as Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992), Henderson,
Kuncoro, and Turner (1995), and Head et al. (1999), con-
sider nonlocal demand, but not using measures derived from
theory.5 In particular, theory suggests that nonlocal demand
must be discounted for bilateral trade impediments. Further-
more, a given amount of market access contributes less to
profits when a firm’s competitors have access to the same
markets. We follow Krugman (1992) in adjusting the market
potential measure to take into account the location of
competitors.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II we derive a
linear-in-logs equation that relates the profitability of a
location to a prospective foreign investor to a measure of
that location’s access to demand. We then show how to
estimate the distance and border effects that impede market
access, using bilateral trade data. In section III we report the
results from the trade equation and show how we use them
to calculate market potential. We then discuss our sample of
Japanese investors and the set of possible location choices.
Our location-choice results are detailed in section IV, and
we conclude and propose directions for future work in
section V.
II. The Model
Let Er denote expenditure in a representative industry
(we omit industry subscripts for notational simplicity) in
region r. Consumers (who may be firms or individuals)
allocate their expenditures across differentiated varieties in
the representative industry. They have constant-elasticity-
of-substitution subutility functions for each industry. Max-
imizing this subutility function subject to expenditure, Er,
and the delivered prices from all R possible product origins,
we obtain the demand curve for the representative variety in
the representative industry as
qij 
pij
¥r1
R nrprj1
Ej, (1)
where pij is the delivered price faced by consumers in
region j (destination) for products from region i (origin). It
is the product of the mill price pj and the trade cost factor
ij. Trade costs include all transaction costs associated with
moving goods across space and national borders.
A. The Profit Equation for Foreign Affiliates
Each firm sets its mill prices to maximize profits. Fol-
lowing Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), firms treat the elasticity of
substitution, , as if it were the price elasticity of demand
(this may also be interpreted as the assumption that each
firm has infinitesimal market share). The resulting mill
prices are simple markups over marginal costs, denoted cr:
thus pr  cr[/(  1)]. Substituting into equation (1), we
obtain the quantity that a firm producing in region i would
deliver6 to each destination region j:
qij 
  1

ciij

Gj
Ej, (2)
where Gj  ¥r nr(crrj)1. The gross profit earned in each
destination region j for a firm producing in region i is
ij   pi  ciijqij 
ciij
1
Gj
Ej. (3)
This gross profit is an increasing function of the expenditure
of country j on the considered industry. The fraction mul-
tiplying Ei depends on the costs of the representative firm
relative to its competitors from all R regions. In the numer-
ator, we see that profits are decreasing in local (region i)
production costs. Lower trade costs to reach region j (that is,
a low ij) also raise profits. Because the effect of trade costs
is always moderated by the elasticity of substitution, we
introduce the notation of 	ij  ij1 to measure the access
of exporters from i to market j.7 The denominator contains
the corresponding characteristics of competing suppliers.
Note that the denominator contains a factor , capturing the
idea that competition is fiercer and profits are therefore
lower when varieties are less differentiated from each other.
Summing the gross profits earned in each market and
subtracting the fixed costs Fr necessary to establish a plant
in region r, we obtain the aggregate net profit 
r to be
earned in each potential location r:

r 
cr
1


j1
R
	rj
Ej
Gj
 Fr 
cr
1

Mr  Fr, (4)
where
Mr  
j
	rjEj
Gj
.
We will refer to Mr as the Krugman market potential,
because an expression for it first appeared in Krugman
(1992). The profit equation suggests that firms face a
tradeoff between low production costs and high market
potential.8
5 Friedman et al. (1992) use a distance-weighted sum of per capita
incomes, Henderson et al. (1995) use distance to nearest major business
district, and Head et al. (1999) sum the personal incomes of adjacent
states.
6 The iceberg convention implies that to deliver q units, the firm must
ship q units.
7 Baldwin et al. (2003) refer to 	 as “freeness of trade” and mainly
consider cases of symmetric trade costs (	ij  	ji). The term market
access is better suited to our case, where we find asymmetries in trade
costs.
8 The wage equation analyzed by Fujita et al. (1999, p. 53) can be
derived from the profit equation by assuming that free entry sets equation
(4) equal to 0. In their specification, production requires 1-unit of labor per
unit of output and F units of labor as overhead. Denoting the cost of a
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When a firm chooses its location, the only relevant
information is the ordering of the profits. Invariant fixed
costs do not affect the profit ordering of regions and can
therefore be omitted. For tractability, therefore, we assume
that fixed costs do not differ across locations (Fr  F @r).
As monotonic transformations also leave the ordering un-
changed, we will make four of them to create a simple and
intuitive expression for profitability. Namely, we add F,
multiply the result by , raise the result to the power 1/( 
1), and take natural logs. Denoting the result as Ur we
obtain
Ur 
ln  ln
r  F
 1 ln cr   1
1 ln Mr.
(5)
Equation (5) expresses the profitability for a firm of locating
in region r as a very simple function that is decreasing in
production costs and increasing in the Krugman market
potential term.
Considering the cost term first, let us suppose that the
variable cost function is Cobb-Douglas with constant re-
turns, using labor at cost wr and other inputs (such as land
and intermediates) at cost vr. Labor’s share is , and Ar
represents total factor productivity.
Thus, log marginal costs are given by
ln cr   ln wr  1  ln vr  ln Ar. (6)
Substituting (6) into (5) and rearranging, we have
Ur   ln wr   11 ln Mr
 1  ln vr  ln Ar.
(7)
We observe wages wr and will calculate Mr using a method
described in section II B. We do not observe vr and Ar, and
they will be captured with several proxies (specified in
section III C) and a random term observed by firms but not
by the econometrician (detailed in section III B).
The Krugman market potential aggregates the expendi-
tures of all regions while adjusting for region r’s access 	rj
and for competition from firms located in other regions, Gj.
Analyzing the function, we can determine the assumptions
that were implicit in the original Harris (1954) formulation
of market potential. Specifically, if we set Gj  1 and 	rj 
1/drj, then Mr reduces to ¥jEj/drj, that is, the inverse-
distance-weighted sum of incomes. In the Krugman market
potential function Mr, the denominator Gj takes into the
account the competition that firms from region r face from
rival firms exporting from other regions to serve the demand
in each export market j. This competition adjustment is
increasing in the number of rivals and decreasing in their
trade and production costs.
The competition adjustment can help explain why other-
wise identical firms would not all select the same location.
As more firms choose one region, the market there becomes
more crowded, lowering Mr, until another region is more
profitable. This is not the only mechanism causing disper-
sion, however. Firms are not identical and will therefore
differ in their views of the prospective profitability of each
region. This heterogeneity is analogous to matching in labor
markets. In the context of our model, this heterogeneity can
be thought of as firm-specific variation in regional produc-
tivity (ln Ar).
The Krugman market potential has the advantage of
being derived rigorously from theory. However, unlike the
Harris form, its calculation requires estimates of the un-
known parameters 	ij and Gi. Our strategy will be to use
information from international trade flows to estimate these
parameters.
B. The Trade Equation
We do not observe trade flows between regions and must
instead rely upon trade between nations to estimate the
parameters that determine trade costs. Results from Wolf’s
(2000) study of intranational trade in the United States are
reassuring in this respect, for he finds distance effects
resembling those found using international trade data. We
reinterpret equation (2) as giving the quantity exported by a
representative firm in country I to country J (we reserve the
lowercase i and j to denote origin and destination regions).
The aggregate value of country I’s exports to country J,
denoted XIJ, is given by the quantity exported by a repre-
sentative variety firm from I multiplied by the price and the
number of varieties from J:
XIJ  pIJqIJnI  nI
cI
1 	IJEJ
GJ
.
Taking natural logs and grouping variables according to
subscripts, we obtain
ln XIJ  lnnI/cI1 lnEJ/GJ ln 	IJ. (8)
Following Redding and Venables (2004), we will estimate
the first two terms using exporter and importer fixed effects,
denoted EXI and IMJ.9 Bilateral market access (	IJ) will be
estimated as a function of distance (dIJ), borders (BIJ  1labor unit as wr, this implies marginal costs of cr  wr and fixed costs ofFr  Fwr. Solving for wr, we have
wr   1F Mr
1/
.
That is, for firms to be indifferent between locations, wages must be a
power function of market potential. Hanson (2001) and Redding and
Venables (2004) estimate variations of this relationship.
9 An earlier version of this paper [Head and Mayer (2002), available at
cepr.org] used the number of Japanese firms to measure n and calculated
Gj at the regional level. It constructed the ci1 term using wage data and
estimates of  obtained from a first-step trade equation. Our current
approach, suggested by a referee, imposes fewer and more plausible
assumptions but arrives at the same empirical conclusions.
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for I  J), sharing a common language (LIJ  1 if I and
J share a language and I  J, and 0 otherwise), and an error
term, IJ. Parameters capturing the effect of distance, bor-
ders, and language on trade volumes are denoted , J, and
, respectively: 	IJ  dIJ exp[(J  LIJ) BIJ  IJ].
We interpret border effects as comprising home bias in
consumer preferences and government procurement, differ-
ential technical standards, exchange rate uncertainty, and
imperfect information about potential trade partners.10 The
specification allows border effects to differ across importing
countries, which is largely supported by the empirical evi-
dence (see Chen, 2004). The estimated equation will there-
fore be
ln XIJ  EXI  IMJ   ln dIJ  JBIJ  LIJBIJ  IJ.
(9)
The estimated parameters on trade costs and importers’
fixed effects are then used to construct the market potential
variable that will be included in the location choice analysis
of Japanese firms in Europe. Recall that the market potential
of region i is Mi  ¥j 	ij(Ej/Gj), where 	ij is the
accessibility of market j to goods shipped from region i.
The formulas for calculating inter- and intraregional access
are
	ˆ ij  expˆ J  ˆLIJ dij
ˆ
when i  I, j  J, and I  J,
	ˆ ij  dij
ˆ
when i and j belong to the same country, and
	ˆ ii  dii
ˆ 23 areai/ˆ
for intraregional trade.
The last equation models the average distance between a
producer and a consumer based on a stylized geography
where all producers are centrally located and the consumers
uniformly distributed across a disk-shaped region.
The second component of market potential calculation is
regional-level competition-weighted expenditure. Taking
the exponential of importer’s fixed effects’ coefficients, we
obtain EJ/GJ  exp(IMJ), that is, the competition-weighted
expenditure of country J. We calculate Ej/Gj for each region
j of country J by allocating EJ/GJ to the different regions in
proportion to their share of national GDP ( yj/yJ), that is,
Ej/Gj  ( yj/yJ) exp(IMJ).
We also compare the Krugman market potential with the
simpler version proposed by Harris (1954). This variable
sums distance-weighted industry-level expenditures: ¥j Ej/
dij. Again, we allocate national expenditure to regions
according to GDP shares of regions [Ej  ( yj/yJ) EJ].
National expenditure is calculated using apparent consump-
tion, that is, EJ  production  exports  imports in the
considered industry. It comprises final and intermediate
demand from all sectors.
III. Econometric Model and Data
We estimate a model of location choice of 452 Japanese-
owned affiliates that were established in 57 regions belong-
ing to nine European countries (Belgium, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and the
United Kingdom) during the period 1984–1995. As can be
seen in equation (5), we hypothesize that market potential is
a key determinant of this decision. We construct the market
potential for 18 industries using the parameters estimated
from the trade equation (9).
A. Estimation of the Trade Equation
We estimate equation (9) using Eurostat data on bilateral
trade matched with production at the NACE70 two-digit
level. Production data are needed because internal trade
flows, XII are constructed by subtracting total exports (¥JI
XIJ) from national production. Our sample runs from 1980
to 1995 and includes the fifteen 1995 members of the
European Union, plus Switzerland and Norway. Although
the set of EU countries in the location choice analysis only
includes nine members, it is important to incorporate the
demand emanating from the rest of the European Economic
Area in the calculation of the market potential. For instance,
Swiss and Austrian consumers are not trivial components of
the southern German and northern Italian regions’ market
potential that we consider in the location choice of Japanese
firms. Incorporating the demand from those countries in-
volves obtaining estimates of their fixed effects as importers
and of bilateral trade cost parameters, and we therefore
incorporate them in the trade equation.
Both internal (dII) and external (dIJ) distances are
weighted averages of point-to-point distances between sub-
national regions. Head and Mayer (2000) provide greater
detail on their construction and the distance matrix for the
EU12 countries (coordinates and population shares of re-
gions of Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Sweden, and Fin-
land have been collected using a combination of Eurostat
and national sources). The common language variable LIJ
takes a value of 1 for the United Kingdom and Ireland,
Germany and Austria, Germany and Switzerland, France
and Switzerland, Belgium and France, and Belgium and the
Netherlands. The regressions are run for each of the 16
years and 18 industries. Each component of the market
potential gathered through the trade equation (the fixed
effects of importing countries and bilateral trade cost esti-
mates) are thus industry-, year-, and country-specific. More
details on the data and implementation of those regressions
can be found in the data appendix.
10 See Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003b) for a survey of the now large
literature measuring and explaining border effects.
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Table 1 summarizes the border, distance, and language
effects estimated for each two-digit industry. This table
gives the average coefficients over two subperiods of our
sample, 1980–1987 and 1988–1995, chosen because of the
start of the Single Market Programme in 1987, which was
expected to yield a fall in border effects. The border effects
presented average over the four large sources of demand
inside our sample, Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and Italy.
We find distance effects that average 1.4 across the two
periods. This number aligns closely with the results of
Redding and Venables (2004); it is slightly superior to usual
estimates of gravity equations11 and suggests Harris’s as-
sumption of an inverse distance rule is a rough but reason-
able approximation. Where Harris’s specification appears
inappropriate for Europe is in its omission of the effect of
national borders.12
Border effects for the four core EU countries average 1.84 in
the first period and 1.63 in the second period. Expressing their
magnitude in the McCallum (1995) manner, within-border
trade after 1987 remains more than five [exp(1.63)  5.1]
times as large as cross-border trade after controlling for the
effect of relative distance and characteristics of the trading
partners (in particular their economic size). Though sizable,
these effects are considerably smaller than the value of 20 first
reported by McCallum for the Canada-U.S. border, but more
comparable to the rescaled estimates obtained by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003a) when using a specification more
closely linked to theory. In contrast with distance effects, there
appears to be a downward trend in the effects of national
borders in the EU; all but one of the border effects declined.
We also find large common-language effects. The trade-
creating effect of common language is slightly increasing over
time, from an average of 0.39 in the first period to 0.42 in the
second one. Interestingly, we observe large variation across
industries in the effect of sharing a language. Goods bought
mainly as intermediate inputs tend to have smaller language
effects than goods destined for final consumption. For instance,
country pairs sharing a language trade 2.5 times more clothing
and footwear than pairs lacking a common language.
B. Specification of the Location Choice Model
We estimate the parameters of the profit equation (7)
using a discrete choice model. As we do not observe the
potential profitability of each location, we rely upon the
assumption that firms choose the country yielding the high-
est profit. The location choice literature makes extensive use
of the conditional logit model (CLM). This model requires
error terms that are independent across locations. As it
seems likely that the unobserved component of profitability
is correlated among regions in the same nation, we use a
generalization that permits such a structure of the random
term, the nested logit model (NLM).13
For estimation purposes it is useful to decompose equa-
tion (7) into components that are observable at the nation-
state level, denoted Vs, and at the region level, denoted Wr,
as well as remaining random variation that the econometri-
cian does not observe, denoted r:
Ur  Vs  Wr  r.11 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003a) also use this fixed-effects spec-ification in the sensitivity analysis reported in their table 6, p. 187.
Interestingly, they mention a substantial rise in the (absolute value of the)
distance decay parameter, which becomes 1.25 for U.S.-Canada trade
flows.
12 His pioneering study considered the market potential of counties
within the United States.
13 Train (2003) provides a clear description of the nested logit method-
ology. Mayer and Mucchielli (2002) use the same sample used here to
confirm the validity of a structure nesting region choice under nation
choice.
TABLE 1.—ESTIMATES OF BORDER AND DISTANCE EFFECTS: AVERAGES FOR THE LARGE E.U. NATIONS (FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM)
Industry Name
NACE
Code
1980–1987 1988–1995
Border
(ˆ )
Dist.
(ˆ)
Lang.
(ˆ )
Border
(ˆ )
Dist.
(ˆ)
Lang.
(ˆ )
Metal—primary 22 1.3 1.5 .04 0.80 1.55 .17
Nonmetallic mineral products 24 2.29 1.67 .24 2.11 1.68 .22
Chemicals and fibers 25, 26 1.81 1.19 .06 1.62 1.22 .06
Metal—fabricated 31 2.72 1.54 .39 2.61 1.47 .48
Machinery 32 1.56 1.08 .26 1.42 1.06 .32
Office machines 33 0.75 0.83 .15 0.85 0.79 .15
Electronics 34 2.09 0.99 .32 1.76 1.01 .33
Motor vehicles and parts 35 0.95 1.68 .44 0.89 1.52 .37
Cycles 363 0.96 2.12 .27 0.66 1.87 .53
Precision instruments 37 1.51 1.00 .34 1.05 0.98 .15
Food, drink, and tobacco 41, 42 2.94 1.29 .59 2.77 1.38 .48
Textiles 43 2.72 1.28 .46 2.45 1.26 .59
Leather 44 1.76 1.43 .62 1.23 1.49 .62
Clothing and footwear 45 1.95 1.51 .92 1.87 1.48 .91
Wood and wooden furniture 46 2.56 1.91 .74 2.4 1.96 .68
Paper, printing, and publishing 47 2.66 1.55 .6 2.54 1.46 .56
Rubber and plastics 48 1.91 1.35 .20 1.85 1.36 .23
Toys and sports 494 0.72 1.23 .52 0.52 1.23 .74
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Vs includes national policies—corporate tax rates and social
charges in this study—that affect all regions. Wr includes
wages and market potential as well as proxies for other
input prices and productivity (detailed in section II C). We
envision the random term r as a shock to ln Ar that is
specific to firm-region pairs (we continue to suppress firm
subscripts for readability). It also contains any other influ-
ences on the attractiveness of a location that matter to firms
but are not included as controls by the econometrician.
McFadden (1978) shows that if the distribution of r is
given by a multivariate extreme value with parameter ,
then the conditional probability that firms choose region r
conditional on choosing state s is Prs  exp(1Wr  Zs),
where Zs  ln ¥is exp(1Wi) is termed the inclusive
value for state s. The probability of choosing nation s is
Ps  exp(Vs  Zs  Z˜ ), where Z˜  ln[¥I exp(VI 
ZI)]. The parameter  measures the degree of indepen-
dence between the unobserved portion of profitability of
regions in a given state. For   0, regions are perfect
substitutes inside a nation, whereas for   1 there is full
independence and patterns of substitution are the same
within and between nations. We also consider this non-
nested version of the model corresponding to   1. In that
case the probability of choosing a region r is Pr  PrsPs 
exp(Vs  Wr  Z˜ ). Consequently, the NLM collapses to
the CLM.
The parameters on the components of Ur will be esti-
mated by substituting the probabilities (Pr) of the actual
location choices made by Japanese firms in Europe into a
log likelihood function and maximizing.
C. Implementation of the Location Choice Model
The sample of Japanese firms is extracted from the 1996
Survey of Current Manufacturing Operations of Japanese
Firms in Europe issued by the Japan External Trade Orga-
nization (JETRO). More than 700 Japanese manufacturing
investments are listed in this survey, with corresponding
date when operation started, country of location, employ-
ment, and other details, including a detailed description of
the product manufactured. In order to assign investments to
subnational regions, the Directory of Japanese-Affiliated
Companies in the EU: 1996–1997, also issued by JETRO,
was used to determine the precise city where the plant was
located. Almost all explanatory variables come from indus-
trial statistics issued by Eurostat either at the national or at
the regional level. The selection of Japanese investments
(452 retained location decisions over the years 1984–1995)
was essentially driven by the availability of regional and
national data. Further details concerning the data can be
found in the data appendix, which includes table A1 show-
ing the regions in our choice set and the number of Japanese
firms each one received.
Figure 1 uses these data to plot the Japanese affiliates in
the NUTS 1 region where they invested.14 Several important
features of Japanese investment patterns are immediately
apparent: The strong attractiveness of the United Kingdom
as a whole, the agglomeration in the northern part of
Europe, and a tendency of investors to locate in the eco-
nomic core of each country (Japanese investors cluster in
London in the United Kingdom, Paris in France, Milan in
Italy, and Barcelona in Spain).
Although the theoretical model of the location decision
focuses on wages and market potential, the large literature on
location choice includes a number of other explanatory vari-
ables. We include the standard controls. For wages, we use the
total wage bill divided by number of employees in the two-
digit industry region. Wages do not provide a complete de-
scription of labor costs, because the functioning of the labor
market (measured by unemployment rates) and government-
imposed charges also contribute to the true cost of workers.
Government subsidies and taxes affect the cost of capital (part
of v in the model); we control for those through corporate tax
rates and eligibility for E.U. regional policy funding. Last, we
follow Coughlin et al. (1991) and add land area of the region,
intended to control for differences in land supply and therefore
land prices, which also enter v.
Much evidence suggests that related firms tend to cluster in
the same regions. We consider three forms of relatedness:15 (1)
establishments in the same industry; (2) affiliates in the same
industry originating from the same country (Japan); (3) affili-
ates owned by the same parent company or affiliated in the
same supplier groups (known as keiretsu in Japan). Clusters of
related firms may form regional production networks, selling
intermediate inputs to each other and thereby lowering vr. They
may also share knowledge, raising Ar. It is also likely that
clusters will form around the same exogenous sources of low
input costs or high productivity. Of particular interest to this
paper is the hypothesis that clusters form in areas with high
market potential in the relevant industry. This hypothesis
would receive support if, after controlling for market potential,
the presence of same industry firms lowers the attractiveness of
a region. Regardless of the underlying mechanism, we will
refer to the three cluster variables as agglomeration effects. All
variables used in our specification of production costs are
described in table 2.
IV. Location Choice Results
We begin with an assessment of the performance of our
market potential variable in a conventional specification
used in the literature. We therefore start with the nonnested
conditional logit estimation of the region choices of Japa-
nese firms in Europe (table 3). We then turn to a nested logit
14 NUTS is the official classification for E.U. regions; it has five levels
of geographical detail, ranging from 15 NUTS 0 nations to more than
100,000 NUTS 5 areas.
15 Head et al. (1999) find evidence that all three forms matter for
Japanese location choices in the United States.
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specification in which we first estimate the choice of region
within a given nation and then estimate the choice of nation
taking into account the attractiveness of its constituent
regions (table 4).
A. Region Choice: Nonnested Logit
Table 3 provides results for six different conditional logit
estimations of the location choice of Japanese affiliates
FIGURE 1.—JAPANESE INVESTORS IN EUROPE AT THE END OF 1995
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among E.U. regions. Specification (1) shows coefficients for
the standard set of production cost variables, excluding the
difficult-to-interpret agglomeration effects. Specifications
(2) to (4) add successively more sophisticated measures of
demand, culminating with the Krugman market potential.
Column (5) adds nation-level fixed effects to the analysis,
which is a first way to capture unobserved correlations in
the characteristics of regions belonging to the same nation.
Column (6) adds the counts of various types of related firms.
Though conventional wisdom would predict a negative
effect for wages and a positive effect for unemployment, the
results in specification (1) yield just the opposite. As we
shall see, neither “perverse” result is robust to the inclusion
of appropriate controls. The effect of wages is small and
statistically insignificant after using any of the controls for
demand. The absence of a significant negative effect of
regional wages on location choice in all specifications is
disappointing. However, the result is not out of line with
other studies (such as Devereux & Griffith, 1998, and Head
et al., 1999). Because the standard model of wage determi-
nation (the Mincer equation) explains differences in wages
with differences in human capital (education, experience,
and ability) that are presumably valuable to the firm, am-
biguous results should perhaps be expected.16
16 In unreported regressions we attempted to control for this effect of
human capital differences by using the wage of the clothing industry as a
measure of unskilled wages and that of the chemical industry as a measure
of skilled wages. The idea (for which we thank a referee) was to purge the
wage measure of cross-regional human capital variation. Unfortunately,
TABLE 3.—CONDITIONAL LOGIT MODEL OF REGION CHOICE
Specification
452 Firms Choosing between 57 Regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln wages 0.47c 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.50 0.13
(0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.25) (0.34) (0.36)
Unemployment rate 8.90a 4.50a 1.57 3.22c 4.34c 1.35
(1.69) (1.70) (1.95) (1.78) (2.28) (2.43)
Obj. 1 eligibility 0.25 0.12 0.25 0.01 0.22 0.24
(0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25)
ln regional area 0.31a 0.05 0.58a 0.59a 0.58a 0.21b
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Social charges rate 2.26a 2.28a 2.25a 1.56a 0.24 0.01
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (1.83) (1.86)
Corporate tax rate 4.82a 4.80a 5.03a 4.96a 0.40 0.34
(0.59) (0.58) (0.60) (0.61) (2.36) (2.34)
ln regional GDP 0.80a
ln yr (0.08)
ln Harris market potential 1.88a
ln ¥j Ej/drj (0.21)
ln Krugman market potential 1.11a 1.07a 0.34b
ln Mr (0.13) (0.14) (0.16)
ln(1  domestic industry count) 0.52a
(0.08)
ln(1  Japan industry count) 0.86a
(0.11)
ln(1  network count) 1.24a
(0.22)
National fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Likelihood ratio index 0.054 0.079 0.077 0.073 0.079 0.126
Standard errors in parentheses.
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
TABLE 2.—PRODUCTION COST SPECIFICATIONS
Geographic Level Variable Definition
Region-specific (Wr) Wages Total wage bill divided by number of employees in the two-digit industry region
Unemployment rate Unemployed as percentage of the labor force
Obj. 1 eligibility Equals 1 when the per capita income of the region is less than 75% of the E.U.
average, the critical value for qualifying for E.U. structural funds
Area Land area of region
Domestic industry count Number of establishments in the two-digit industry region
Japan industry count Number of Japanese affiliates in the three-digit industry region
Network count Number of affiliates owned by the same Japanese parent or members of same
vertical keiretsu
Nation-specific (Vs) Corporate tax rate Statutory rate of taxation for profits made by foreign investors
Social charges rate Nonwage labor costs, such as payroll taxes and pension contributions, divided
by the total labor cost (wage bill  social charges).
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Larger regions attract significantly more investors than
small ones in all specifications except (2). The elasticity is
significantly below the unit value that Coughlin et al. (1991)
refer to as the “dartboard” approach to location decision. We
see these results, which appear in the nested estimation as
well, as indirect support for the importance of land costs in
location decisions (using land area rather than land values
probably makes sense, for the latter is likely to reflect
unobserved qualities of the location). Regions eligible for
Objective One subsidies have, by definition, low per capita
incomes, and these two effects seem to cancel each other
out, yielding insignificant effects.
The social charge rate enters with a consistently negative
sign until nation-specific fixed effects are added in column
(5). The negative and mainly significant effects of social
charges make sense in that this variable incorporates vari-
ation in labor costs that is unrelated to human capital.
Unfortunately, it does not vary across regions within na-
tions, and its time-series variation is inadequate to identify
a clear result. The effect of corporate taxation appears to be
large, in line with recent estimates surveyed in the meta-
analysis on FDI and corporate taxes by Mooij and Ederveen
(2001). The coefficient in column (1) means that a 1-point
rise in the national corporate tax rate yields a fall of
approximately 5% in the probability that regions in that
country will be chosen. The comparable average semielas-
ticity in the literature, reported in table 3.1 in Mooij and
Ederveen (2001), is 4.8. As with social charges, the tax
effect is not robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects.
The evolution of corporate tax rates over the period did not
seem to influence the location choices by Japanese inves-
tors.
The main results of interest lie in columns (2) to (5),
where we introduce different demand variables and com-
pare results of the Krugman market potential with those of
alternative proxies for demand. We start, in column (2), by
adding the most widely used demand measure, regional
GDP. As expected, the coefficient is positive and highly
significant. The measure is hardly an adequate proxy for
demand, for few firms would go to the trouble of setting up
an overseas factory to serve a single region. Column (3)
substitutes the simple Harris market potential calculation for
regional GDP. The coefficient is again significantly positive,
and its magnitude is more than double that of local GDP,
reflecting the attractiveness of central regions in Europe
(the ones with a combination of high local demand and
proximity to other important sources of demand). The over-
all fit of the model is however slightly reduced. The Harris
measure does not take into account border effects, variation
in distance costs, or market crowding due to local compe-
tition. The Krugman market potential, which handles all
three issues, is introduced in column (4). The coefficient has
the expected sign and significance, but its magnitude is
lower than the coefficient in Harris’s version, and the overall
fit of the model is worse (as seen in the 0.004 decline of the
likelihood ratio index). The coefficient is however robust to
the inclusion of national fixed effects in column (5).
How substantial is the effect of market potential on
location choice? There are two ways to evaluate the size of
the effect. First, the coefficient itself is closely tied to the
probability elasticity, which is given by bˆ (1  Pr), where
bˆ is the coefficient and Pr is the probability of choosing
region r. On average, Pr is the reciprocal of the number of
choices. Using column (5)’s estimate of bˆ , we find a
probability elasticity of 1.07(1  1/57)  1.05. Thus, 10%
increases in market potential increase the probability of
attracting investment by approximately 10%. Though use-
ful, this way of expressing economic significance does not
take into account the actual variation in the explanatory
variable.
A second approach is to imagine a hypothetical region
with the mean level of market potential. Denote this region’s
initial probability of being chosen as P . Then redistribute
demand so as to raise the region’s market potential by 1
standard deviation. Denote the new probability as P . Sup-
pose that the demand redistribution leaves the overall at-
tractiveness of European regions unchanged, that is, the
inclusive value, Z˜ , is fixed. Then the rise in the probability
of attracting investment will be given by
P 
P
 expbˆlnmeanMr stdevMr
 lnmeanMr
 1 cvMrb
ˆ
,
where cv(Mr)  stdev(Mr)/mean(Mr) is the coefficient of
variation of market potential. For electronics (NACE 34),
the recipient of the most Japanese manufacturing, we have
a coefficient of variation of Mr of 0.58 in the year 1995.
Based on bˆ  1.07 from specification (5), this implies that
a 1-standard-deviation shock would increase the attractive-
ness of the average region by 63%. The effects on other
industries, which mainly had greater variance in Mr, are
sometimes considerably larger (for motor vehicles the cor-
responding increase is 159%).
The agglomeration variables introduced in specification
(6) may allow for alternative mechanisms of spatial con-
centration, such as human capital externalities or techno-
logical spillovers, which have been the primary emphasis of
past work on location choice using this type of variables.
This paper is the first to control for market potential using
the exact functional form dictated by theory. Thus, if prior
findings of agglomeration effects merely reflected the ab-
sence of adequate controls for variation in demand, the
agglomeration terms would not have significant positive
effects in our specification and could even enter negatively
to the extent that firms wish to avoid overcrowded markets.
the two wages were highly correlated and neither singly nor jointly
yielded negative and significant effects.
MARKET POTENTIAL AND JAPANESE INVESTMENT 967
Although estimated agglomeration effects are often inter-
preted as evidence of spatial externalities, this is not the
only possible interpretation. Even with the many controls
and national fixed effects employed in specification (5), it is
likely that omitted variables remain a problem. Fixed effects
for each region are not feasible, because they cannot be
estimated for regions that received no investment. Counts of
firms in the same industry will partly reflect omitted vari-
ables, which form part of the unobserved attractiveness of
regions and therefore correlate with large numbers of do-
mestic and Japanese firms. Adding agglomeration variables
therefore also has the advantage of mitigating the inevitable
omitted variable bias in this type of estimation.
The data reject the hypothesis of zero agglomeration
effects, despite the presence of the Krugman market poten-
tial term. Market potential retains a significant positive sign,
but the coefficient is divided by more than 3, and the overall
fit of the estimation is very much improved by including the
counts of related firms. Market potential remains an eco-
nomically significant factor, however. A 1-standard-
deviation shock now increases attractiveness by 17% in
electronics and 35% in motor vehicles. We interpret the
result that counts of related firms have a strong effect even
after controlling for market potential—which recurs in the
nested logits—as indicating that spatial concentration arises
in large part from mechanisms other than the demand
linkages emphasized by Krugman.
Another interesting result is that the influence of previous
location choices by similar firms is increasing in the degree
of relatedness of those competitors. All three variables have
a large and positive influence, but the domestic firms in each
region have a notably weaker attractive power than other
Japanese affiliates, which are themselves superseded by
members of the same vertical keiretsu. This last variable
certainly captures input-output linkages of the Venables
(1996) type. Its large coefficient is a sign that this type of
vertical linkages might offer more solid empirical explana-
tory power than the simple version of the Krugman (1991)
model primarily based on final demand linkages.
B. Region Choices Nested within Nation Choices
The use of the country dummies in specifications (5) and
(6) of table 3 helps to mitigate the problem associated with
nonindependent errors across regions belonging to the same
nation. However, the country fixed effects do not solve
problems associated with cross-industry and intertemporal
differences in the attractiveness of nations. By considering
TABLE 4.—NESTED LOGIT MODEL OF REGION AND NATION CHOICE
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
421 Firms Choosing within 7 Nations
ln wages 1.21b 0.53 0.12 0.10 0.34
(0.48) (0.53) (0.50) (0.50) (0.52)
Unemployment rate 9.77a 3.97 2.15 1.03 0.53
(2.39) (2.52) (2.76) (2.63) (2.76)
Obj. 1 eligibility 0.89a 0.71b 0.81b 0.74b 0.54
(0.33) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36)
ln regional area 0.29a 0.07 0.59a 0.69a 0.26b
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
ln regional GDP 0.82a
 ln yr (0.09)
ln Harris market potential 2.30a
 ln ¥j Ej/drj (0.26)
ln Krugman market potential 1.41a 0.51b
 (ln Mr) (0.17) (0.22)
ln(1  domestic industry count) 0.53a
(0.11)
ln(1  Japan industry count) 0.65a
(0.13)
ln(1  network count) 1.46a
(0.26)
Likelihood ratio index 0.054 0.097 0.095 0.093 0.146
421 Firms Choosing among 7 Nations
Social charges rate 2.66a 2.54a 2.68a 2.11a 2.27a
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.45)
Corporate tax rate 3.20a 3.69a 2.79a 3.32a 2.08a
(0.65) (0.63) (0.63) (0.62) (0.55)
Inclusive value 0.59a 0.78a 0.53a 0.65a 0.69a
Zs (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Likelihood ratio index 0.115 0.134 0.117 0.132 0.139
Standard errors in parentheses.
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
c Significant at 10% level.
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the choice of region for a given choice of nation, we
condition on all aspects of the nation that do not vary across
its constituent regions from the perspective of a given
investor. The drawback is that we must omit the national tax
and social charges variables. However, we reintroduce them
when estimating the upper level of the decision tree (nation
choice).
The nested region choice forces us to remove Portugal
and Ireland, because they lack subnational regions in our
data set. This reduces the set of choosers from 452 to 421.
The choices sets vary in size from 4 (Belgium and the
Netherlands) to 11 (Germany, Italy, and the United King-
dom). On average there are 9.22 choices per Japanese
investor.
Table 4 reestimates the same specifications as table 3 in a
nested structure. The results are broadly similar. As before,
controlling for demand eliminates a spurious positive effect
for wages. Controlling for both market potential and ag-
glomeration, the wage and unemployment effects conform
to conventional wisdom, albeit without statistical signifi-
cance. Market potential has a statistically significant effect
even after controlling for agglomeration effects; however,
the inclusion of the latter improve the fit considerably. Both
market potential variables have larger effects on region
choice within nations than they do on nonnested region
choice.17
We again find that “theory doesn’t pay,” in the sense that
the Harris market potential outperforms the Krugman mar-
ket potential in both magnitude and fit. In contrast, Hanson
(2001) finds that when he augments the Harris function to
include relationships derived from the Krugman model, the
fit improves. However, Hanson’s simulations show that
income shocks in the Harris-based formulation of market
potential have larger effects on the wages paid in nearby
counties than in the Krugman-based formulation. The broad
similarity in results for the two formulations suggests that
we should be cautious in interpreting the positive effect of
market potential as evidence for the particular mechanisms
of Krugman-style models of economic geography. Other
models of economic geography could generate observation-
ally equivalent results.
The lower panel of table 4 reports estimates for the choice
of nation. These estimations directly consider the national
variables (taxes and social charges) but indirectly consider
all the regional determinants of attractiveness as they enter
the inclusive value Zs for each nation. We do not include
country dummies, because there would not be sufficient
remaining variation in the data.
We find consistently negative effects of social charges.
Corporate income taxes have large negative effects. Like the
results on the nonnested specification, those on social
charges and tax are fragile. Including a dummy for Ireland
and the United Kingdom makes both effects become much
smaller and insignificant. This result raises the question of
whether low charges and taxes or some other effect (the use
of English?) made these countries so attractive to Japanese
investors.
The inclusive value, Zs, an index of the maximum ex-
pected profitability from locating in a given country con-
sidering the underlying characteristics of its regions, obtains
reasonable values in all specifications, differing quite sig-
nificantly from the value of 1 that would obviate the need
for nesting and the value of 0 in which investors are
indifferent between regions inside a given country. In other
words, the coefficient on the inclusive value supports the
validity of our country-region nesting structure.
V. Conclusion
We analyze the determinants of location choices by Jap-
anese firms in Europe. Our work is particularly concerned
with the appropriate way to take into account the spatial
distribution of demand in location decisions. We rigorously
link the optimal location choice of Japanese investors to a
theoretical model of imperfect competition in a multiloca-
tion setting. The underlying profit equation incorporates a
term that is closely related to the market potential index
originally introduced and used by geographers (Harris,
1954). Our theory-derived term aggregates the spatial dis-
tribution of demand weighted by trade costs and the location
of potential competitors. We estimate the border and dis-
tance effects that determine market accessibility using a
bilateral trade equation implied by the same model that
generates the profit equation.
We find that demand does matter for location choice: A
10% increase in our market potential term raises the chance
of a region being chosen by 3% to 11%, depending on the
specification. Despite the fact that we bring theory to em-
pirical implementation in a structural way, the “correct”
measure of market potential actually underperforms the
atheoretical Harris (1954) measure. Moreover, nonstructural
agglomeration variables retain a robust influence. These
results suggest that the downstream linkages emphasized in
Krugman (1991) are not the only or even the main cause of
agglomeration. Future research should probably consider
other reasons why firms cluster. It does not seem possible to
falsify the hypothesis that observed agglomeration effects
merely reflect omitted exogenous location attributes. How-
ever, a natural follow-up to this paper would be to estimate
structural location choice models that implement the Ven-
ables (1996) setup with upstream and downstream linkages
based on an input-output matrix.
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DATA APPENDIX
1. Trade Equation Estimation
Most data used in estimating equation (9) come from Eurostat data-
bases, and were in part already used in Head and Mayer (2000), where
more details can be found. The COMEXT database provides bilateral
trade flows. The VISA database provides the production data used to
calculate internal trade flows of a country, subtracting its value from the
value of total exports of the country. Production values are adjusted to
allow for the fact that some countries reported data only for firms larger
than 20 employees in the years we are considering, whereas trade flows
are exhaustive. Trade and production figures are then both converted into
NACE two-digit industries in order to match the level of detail of the
subsequent location choice estimation. Though this is straightforward for
production data and trade flow data after 1987 (provided by Eurostat in
NACE three-digit), a large concordance work is needed to convert trade
flows for the previous period from NIMEXE to NACE three-digit. This
has been done using a correspondence available from the site http://
www.eiit.org/.
Distance calculations are crucial in this paper for both the trade
equation and profit equation estimations. We calculate the distance of one
nation to another—or itself—as a weighted average of subnational dis-
tances. Considering two countries I and J (the origin and destination
countries of a given flow), respectively consisting of regions indexed i 
I and j  J, the following formula provides both external and internal
distances:
dIJ  
iI
 
jJ
jdij i.
We define dij as the distance between the centers of regions i and j, and
i as the weight of region i, calculated as the share of population in 1990
for both origin and destination weights. The distance from a region to
itself is obtained using a simple geographical approximation. Each region
is approximated as a disk in which all production concentrates at the
center and consumers are uniformly distributed throughout the rest of the
area. The average distance between a producer and a consumer is then
given by
dii  
0
R
r
2r
R2 dr,
where R denotes the radius of the disk, and 2r/R2 is the density of
consumers at any given distance r to the center. We obtain R as the square
root of the area A divided by . Integrating, we obtain dii  23 R 
2
3A/  0.376A.
The estimation procedure consists of 288 OLS regressions (18 indus-
tries  16 years), providing the estimates to be used for the construction
of market potentials. Each regression yields the importers’ fixed effect, the
estimated effects of bilateral distance and common language, and a set of
importer-specific border effects. Those border effects are identified using
internal trade flows and therefore cannot be estimated for observations
where production figures are missing. This is in particular the case for
non-E.U. countries, for which Eurostat does not report data. We apply the
estimated German border effect to northern European countries (Sweden,
Finland, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria) and the estimated French
border effect for southern European countries: Greece is assigned the
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French border effect for the whole period; Spain and Portugal have
missing data before their membership in 1986. For this year, we calculate
a ratio of French to Spanish and Portuguese border effects and apply this
ratio to the French border effect to get Spanish and Portuguese values for
the preceding years. After those adjustments, there are a few remaining
holes in the data, mainly resulting from the well-known confidentiality
issues in Belgium and the Netherlands for production data. Those missing
figures are filled in taking an average of the industry and country average
border effects for the corresponding year.
2. Location Choice Estimation
2.a Regions and years used
The regional level choice sets incorporate 57 regions in Europe using
the NUTS 1 level of detail for Germany (11 regions), France (8 regions),
Italy (11 regions), the United Kingdom (11 regions), Spain (6 regions), the
Netherlands (4 regions), and Belgium (4 regions). Ireland and Portugal are
considered as single-region countries. Out of those 57 regions, 50 were
chosen at least once by Japanese investors.
Industry-level regional data availability limits the sample to the years
1984–1995. Although there are some Japanese investments in the late
seventies and early eighties, the vast majority of the investments took
place in the late eighties.
2.b Affiliates
The location choices of Japanese affiliates are mainly extracted from
JETRO’s Survey of Current Manufacturing Operations of Japanese Firms
in Europe, 1996. This source provides in particular the country chosen and
the date on which operations started for all manufacturing affiliates which
had established operations in Europe by the end of 1995. Dropping
investments in a set of countries (Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Austria,
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland) and years (before
1984 and after 1995) for which explanatory variables were not available,
we obtain 452 location choices to be explained.
We then identified for each firm the city in which the production unit
was located. This information appears in a larger document also issued by
JETRO: The Directory of Japanese-Affiliated Companies in the EU:
1996–1997.
A crucial matter for our study is the quality of this information: It had
to be checked that, in the directory, the affiliate’s location reported was not
that of the headquarters but that of the actual production unit. Fortunately,
the directory almost always specifies both the location of the headquarters
and the location of the plant. However, the information was double
checked using three alternative sources: The database used by Yamawaki
et al. (1998), mostly using data from Toyo Keisai and kindly made
available by Hideki Yamawaki, was of great help. Table 5.4 in Strange
(1992) also confirmed the locations of Japanese subsidiaries in the United
Kingdom. Finally, a document from the DATAR helped to check locations
for France.
The Japanese affiliates’ location choice is of course our dependent
variable, but is also used to construct the Japanese counts agglomeration
variable. This variable consists, for each choice, of a cumulative count of
same three-digit industry affiliates that chose each region from the first
year where Japanese FDI started in Europe until the year preceding the
choice under consideration. We also use these data to calculate the
network counts. For each prospective investor it counts the number of
affiliated firms that already chose the region in question. We defined
“affiliated” so that it includes investments with the same Japanese parent
company (for example, two different Sony factories) or investments from
parent companies that are members of the same industrial group (for
example, a Toyota assembly factory and a Nippondenso automotive
electronics factory). We defined industrial groups using Dodwell’s (1988)
lists of vertical keiretsu.
3. Market Potential Calculation
As detailed in the text, the calculation of regional Krugman market
potential involves (1) a regional allocation of competition-weighted ex-
penditure estimated at the nation and industry levels in the trade equations
detailed above, and (2) measures of bilateral distances between regions
across the European Union.
We allocate the national competition-weighted expenditure of each
industry among its regions according to the share of national GDP.
Regional GDP shares come from Eurostat’s REGIO database. Bilateral
regional geodesic distances are calculated using the coordinates of the
main city in each region, which were collected manually. Distance inside
a region only requires data on the land area of the region, also obtained
from the REGIO database.
Note finally that market potential calculation involves six countries that
are not present in the location choice set of Japanese affiliates. Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland are included in the
analysis in order to allow for the fact that some regions in the choice set
have their market potential enhanced more than others by demand ema-
nating from those six countries.
The calculation of the Harris market potential also involves bilateral
distances between all regions, and national apparent consumption in each
industry, allocated to regions using the same regional shares of GDP as in
the Krugman market potential. National apparent consumption is obtained
using the same Eurostat data as were used in the trade equations and
detailed above.
4. Industry-Level Regional Data
The main source of industry-level regional data is the Eurostat publi-
cation Structure and Activity of Industry Annual Inquiry, Principal Re-
sults, Regional Data. It consists of two-digit NACE data, essentially
available for NUTS 1 regions. This database contains the number of
establishments, employment statistics, and the wage bill for each industry-
region combination. For single-region countries, national-level data are
used.
An electronic version exists with regional data for the years 1989 to
1992, but in fact 1992 has many missing values. We additionally used the
printed version for 1984 and 1987. Observations for 1984 to 1986 are
matched with the 1984 data. Observations for 1987 and 1988 are matched
with the 1987 data. 1989, 1990 and 1991 observations are matched with
same-year data. Observations from 1992 to 1995 are matched with 1991
data. NACE 26 (man-made fibers industry) was excluded from the sample
because too few data were available. When the data were missing for a
particular NUTS 1 region, the following procedure was adopted: The
missing values are often due to missing values in small NUTS 2 subre-
gions (for instance, Corsica in Me´dite´rrane´e or Val d’Aoste in Nord Ovest
have many missing employment and wage values because there are only
one or two firms. In this case we just sum the remaining NUTS 2 regions
to get what appears to be a very precise approximation of the true data. In
other cases too many data from subregions were missing for a particular
year; we then replaced the figure with its value for the nearest year
available. As a general pattern, the main problems in data availability
concerned Netherlands and (even more) Belgium.
5. National-Level Data
Variables at the national level are the corporate tax rate and the social
charges rate. Social charges rates use Eurostat data on nonwage labor costs
(such as payroll taxes and pension contributions) at the two-digit industry-
country level. The source is the national version of the database Structure
and Activity of Industry, also used to obtain regional data. The variable
consists of the share of those charges in the total labor cost of the industry.
The corporate tax data are the national statutory tax rates taken from the
data set put together by Devereux et al. (2002) and made available at
http://www1.ifs.org.uk/corptaxindex.shtml.
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TABLE A1.—THE LOCATION OF JAPANESE AFFILIATES IN EUROPEAN REGIONS IN 1996
Region Code Jpn. Firms Region Code Jpn. Firms
Belgium
Brabant BE0 7
Bruxelles-Brussels BE1 4
Vlaams Gewest BE2 17
Region Wallonne BE3 8
Germany
Baden-Wuerttemberg DE1 8
Bayern DE2 16
Berlin DE3 1
Bremen DE5 0
Hamburg DE6 6
Hessen DE7 12
Niedersachsen DE9 10
Nordrhein-Westfalen DEA 25
Rheinland-Pfalz DEB 6
Saarland DEC 0
Schleswig-Holstein DEF 4
United Kingdom
North UK1 18
Yorkshire and Humberside UK2 10
East Midlands UK3 9
East Anglia UK4 3
South East (U.K.) UK5 51
South West (U.K.) UK6 13
West Midlands UK7 27
North West (U.K.) UK8 11
Wales UK9 31
Scotland UKA 21
Northern Ireland UKB 2
Spain
Noroeste ES1 1
Noreste ES2 5
Madrid ES3 8
Centro (e) ES4 2
Este ES5 34
Sur ES6 3
Netherlands
Noord-Nederland NL1 0
Oost-Nederland NL2 6
West-Nederland NL3 12
Zuid-Nederland NL4 19
Italy
Nord Ovest IT1 6
Lombardia IT2 19
Nord Est IT3 2
Emilia-Romagna IT4 4
Centro (i) IT5 4
Lazio IT6 3
Abruzzi-Molise IT7 0
Campania IT8 0
Sud IT9 1
Sicilia ITA 0
Sardegna ITB 0
France
Ile de France FR1 32
Bassin Parisien FR2 18
Nord-Pas-de-Calais FR3 2
Est FR4 16
Ouest FR5 6
Sud-Ouest FR6 11
Centre-Est FR7 7
Mediterranee FR8 2
Ireland
Ireland IE 30
Portugal
Portugal PT 12
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